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Risk taking has long been a central theme of the entrepreneurship literature. However,
research on the risk propensity of entrepreneurs has met with virtually no empirical sup-
port even though entrepreneurs consistently engage in risky events. This article attempts
to resolve this paradox by examining entrepreneurial risk through the lens of cognitive
psychology and decision making. The author proposes that entrepreneurial risk may be
explained by recognizing that entrepreneurs use biases and heuristics more, which is
likely to lead them to perceive less risk in a given decision situation. The data indicate that
entrepreneurs do indeed use representativeness more in their decision making and are
more overconfident than managers in large organizations. These findings provide a new
perspective for understanding how entrepreneurs deal with the inordinate amount of risk
associated with starting new ventures.
The dominant theme running throughout the entrepreneurship literature is risk and
how entrepreneurs are predisposed toward risky alternatives or how they should man-
age risk (see d’Amboise & Muldowney, 1988; Hebert & Link, 1988, for a review).
Clearly, starting entrepreneurial ventures based on new discoveries and innovations
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entails a great deal of risk, with failure estimates commonly ranging from 50% to 80%
within the first 5 years of existence (Dun and Bradstreet, 1967). When new businesses
pursue uncharted waters with the intent of achieving substantial growth and above
average performance, risk is an inescapable reality. In addition to potentially losing
their financial investments, entrepreneurs also risk career opportunities, family rela-
tionships, personal wealth, and psychic well-being (Bird, 1989). Consequently, entre-
preneurs tend to carry a gambler-like reputation because of their willingness to quickly
purse new markets (d’Ambroise & Muldowney, 1988; Stevenson & Gumpert, 1985).
Although it is clear that entrepreneurs consistently face an inordinate amount of
risk, empirical evidence showing entrepreneurs to have a higher risk propensity has
yielded little support (Brockhaus, 1980; Low & MacMillan, 1988). However, Cooper,
Dunkelberg, and Woo (1988) observed that entrepreneurs generally perceive their
chances for success to be much higher than fellow competitors starting in the same
industries. The disparity between reality and empirical findings on risk propensity has
led researchers to characterize entrepreneurial risk from a variety of perspectives
including risk avoidance approaches (Miner, Smith, & Bracker, 1989; Ray, 1994;
Raynor, 1974). Although entrepreneurs frequently foster important transformational
changes (Bygrave & Timmons, 1992; Nutt & Backoff, 1997) through the risky ven-
tures they undertake, little is understood about their vision and why they think the way
they do. In a recent inquiry, Palich and Bagby (1995) found that entrepreneurs tend to
be predisposed to cognitively categorize business situations more positively. The cog-
nitive perspective provides an important perspective with which to investigate why
some entrepreneurs accept an inordinate amount of risk even though, on average, they
do not apparently differ in their risk-taking propensity. To further explore this phe-
nomenon of risk within entrepreneurship, it is proposed that entrepreneurs use biases
and heuristics more extensively in their decision making and, therefore, fail to fully
acknowledge the risk associated with starting their own businesses. Stated differently,
it may be that entrepreneurs take more risky paths because they perceive little risk in
their proposed ventures.
Psychologists began examining entrepreneurial differences (Collins & Moore,
1964; McClelland, 1961) in part because of an intrigue with the risk that those who
start their own firms clearly accept. A key assumption was that individuals who start
entrepreneurial ventures are also likely to have a propensity to take chances, to be will-
ing to expose themselves to situations with uncertain outcomes, and to thrive on dan-
gerous situations (high risk propensity). However, this stream of research has yielded
disappointing findings (Low & MacMillan, 1988). In the most widely cited study on
the subject, Brockhaus (1980) reported that the risk propensity of entrepreneurs does
not seem to differ significantly from the rest of the general population. Although a cou-
ple of studies have found some modest support for differences in risk propensity
among entrepreneurs (Begley & Boyd, 1987; Sexton & Bowman, 1984), the emerging
consensus is that entrepreneurs do not differ substantially in their risk-taking propen-
sity (Low & MacMillan, 1988; Ray, 1994). This conclusion is widely held even though
it is clear that entrepreneurs are regularly involved in starting ventures that are more
likely to fail than succeed.
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This paradox, that entrepreneurs take more risk but do not have a higher risk pro-
pensity, has yet to be resolved. This article attempts to resolve this contradiction by
examining entrepreneurial risk through the lens of cognitive psychology and decision
making. Since Simon’s (1955) early work, scholars have recognized that managerial
decision making often falls short of a purely rational model (Fredrickson & Mitchell,
1984; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991). Cognitive psychologists, for example, have observed
that people’s perceptions of what constitutes a random event may not conform to what
statistics would predict (Bar-Hillel, 1979; Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977). Instead,
decision makers frequently have conflicting biases and unjustified optimism. The
frequent use of bias and heuristics in decision making (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Zajac & Bazerman, 1991) shows a clear departure from a
normative interpretation of randomness. In sum, cognitive research suggests that deci-
sion makers tend to develop a set of decision rules and biases to explain the random
events in their lives.
In their research on entrepreneurial risk, Palich and Bagby (1995) also found that
entrepreneurs do not view themselves as risk takers. However, in taking a cognitive
perspective, they found that due to schema accessibility, entrepreneurs simply tend to
associate business situations with cognitive categories that suggest more favorable
attributes (greater strengths versus weaknesses, opportunities versus threats, and
potential for future performance improvement versus deterioration).
Building on this stream of research, we propose that increased use of biases and
heuristics helps explain the risky ideas entrepreneurs often pursue. Using their specific
biases and heuristics to filter their decisions, entrepreneurs are likely to perceive less
risk in chosen business opportunities. By being more willing to generalize from lim-
ited experience, and by feeling overconfident that they will be able to master the major
obstacles, entrepreneurs may oversimplify and conclude that their specific ventures
are destined for success. Thus, it is not differences in risk propensity that distinguishes
entrepreneurs from managers in large organizations but differences in the ways they
perceive and think about risk.
In this context, biases and heuristics are decision rules, cognitive mechanisms, and
subjective opinions people use to assist them in making decisions. Frequently, the use
of biases and heuristics yields acceptable solutions to problems for individuals in an
effective and efficient manner (Baron, 1998; Hogarth, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). In this article, the term biases and heuristics will be used to refer to these sim-
plifying strategies that individuals use to make decisions, especially in uncertain and
complex conditions. We define entrepreneurs as those who have founded their own
firms. Managers are individuals with middle- to upper-level responsibilities with sub-
stantial oversight in large organizations.
RISK AND DECISION MAKING
The phenomenon of entrepreneurial risk eventually attracted the attention of
behavioral scientists. McClelland’s (1961) influential work characterized the high
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achieving entrepreneurs as also being moderate risk takers who prefer 50-50 prob-
abilities (McClelland’s entrepreneurial world included business executives and firm
operators). The important study by Brockhaus (1980) also found entrepreneurs to be
moderate risk takers with little difference between them and managers as well as the
general public. Going beyond McClelland’s moderate risk-taking perspective, Raynor
(1974) asserted that success-oriented entrepreneurs should seek a much lower level of
risk than the 50-50 probabilities of immediate risk recommended by McClelland.
Raynor argued that doing so would allow entrepreneurs to lengthen their careers as
business owners. Some empirical work examining successful entrepreneurs supports a
relationship between risk avoidance and motivational patterns (Miner, 1990), com-
pany growth and capital raised (Miner et al., 1989), and environmental uncertainty as a
moderator of the desire to avoid risk (Bellu, Davidsson, & Goldfarb, 1990). However,
the assertion that entrepreneurs desire to avoid risk is based on subjective, not objec-
tive assessments of risks (Bellu, 1993). We also suspect that these findings are most
applicable for entrepreneurs who have experienced a successful startup and for corpo-
rate entrepreneurs who very much desire to preserve the longevity of their established
ventures.
The focus of this study is first of all to understand risk in the context of the startup
process. In contrast to corporate entrepreneurs and successful entrepreneurs who have
interests to protect, we suspect that entrepreneurs in the founding process tend not to
be sensitized to the risk they face. Thus, asking entrepreneurs to engage in risk-
reduction or risk-averse behavior is often inappropriate because they do not view their
ventures as risky (Cooper et al., 1988). Broader research indicates that decision mak-
ers rarely address risk by first calculating and then choosing among the alternative
risk-return combinations available (Heath & Tversky, 1991; March & Shapira, 1987;
Schwenk, 1988). We argue that this is especially true for entrepreneurs.
In support of the idea of increased use of biases and heuristics, entrepreneurs may
have such a strong belief in their ability to impact the venture process that they do not
view themselves as engaging in risky endeavors (Bird, 1989; Zajac & Bazerman,
1991). Because of the market potential they visualize, entrepreneurs may readily view
themselves as experts as they forge their new firms to capitalize on perceived opportu-
nities (Baron, 1998; Gatewood, Shaver, & Gartner, 1995). By viewing an opportunity
as unique and from the inside (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993), entrepreneurs may vastly
underestimate the risk of the opportunities they seek. They also may tend to ignore
potential problems and factors they cannot control. Stated differently, they may accept
risks, in part because they do not expect that they will have to bear them (Low & Mac-
Millan, 1988). Thus, for understanding entrepreneurial behavior, the issue may not be
one of risk propensity or the sensitivity to probability estimates of possible outcomes
but, rather, in how entrepreneurs think about the decisions they make surrounding the
business opportunities they undertake (Gatewood et al., 1995; Ray, 1994). Thus, we
draw on literature from cognitive psychology and strategic decision making to develop
a more unified framework for understanding how entrepreneurs think and why they
make the decisions they do (Baron, 1998). By doing so, we gain some potentially
328 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE September 1999
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
interesting insights into how entrepreneurs accept or cope with an inordinate amount
of risk inherent in the perceived opportunities they attempt to seize.
One important class of nonrational decision-making models that are consistent
with the satisficing principle (Simon, 1955) focuses on biases and heuristics (Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1972; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). A broad range of empirical find-
ings suggests that decision makers frequently apply heuristics to simplify their
decision making and, as a result, often exhibit nonrational biases (Kahneman, Slovic, &
Tversky, 1982). These findings consistently have shown that the expected utility para-
digm is inadequate to describe how managers think about risk (March & Shapira,
1987). Rather, the tendency seems to be for decision makers to evaluate only a small
number of alternatives and to focus on only a few key aspects of the problem (Krueger &
Dickson, 1994) based on a few personal biases and decision rules (Kahneman &
Lovallo, 1993). Increasingly, evidence indicates that individuals vary in the way they
deal with risk (Krueger & Dickson, 1994; Shapira, 1995), and this may be particularly
reflected in their use of specific biases and heuristics. For example, some individuals,
such as entrepreneurs, may be more prone to biases stemming from various heuristics
such as representativeness and overconfidence (Bazerman, 1990; Kahneman et al.,
1982).
Biases and Heuristics in Entrepreneurial Decision Making
An assumption of this article is that there is a relationship between use of biases and
heuristics in decision making and the likelihood of starting your own company. Deci-
sions involving much uncertainty, where risk probabilities are virtually impossible to
calculate, can overwhelm a more comprehensive decision maker. The uncertainty sur-
rounding a start-up can be staggering unless one has a more biased perspective. Those
who more readily use biases and heuristics may use them to make sense out of an
uncertain situation through the application of their own decision rules.
The greater manifestation of biases and heuristics among entrepreneurs, and how
that leads to the acceptance of greater risk, is likely for at least two reasons. First, entre-
preneurs often act very quickly in deciding to start their own firms (Carter, Gartner, &
Reynolds, 1996; Reynolds & Miller, 1992) as they act to exploit brief environmental
windows of opportunity (Hambrick & Crozier, 1985). In such settings, extensive data
collection and analyses to calculate risk probabilities and choose among alternative
risk-return combinations are generally too time-consuming if not impossible to obtain
(Gilmore & Kazanjian, 1989; Shapira, 1995). Heuristic-based decision making
enables individuals to piece together various fragments of information and assimilate
them based on decision rules to make faster decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989) before brief
windows of opportunity close. As Tversky and Kahneman (1974) noted, heuristics
provide intuitive guidelines that usually accelerate the decision process substantially.
The influence of biases and heuristics, such as representativeness and overconfidence,
may enable individuals to easily make decisions with incomplete information. The
more extensive use of biases and heuristics in strategic decision making by
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entrepreneurs also may help explain why they frequently start their ventures with
minimal lead time.
Second, organizational norms that guide decision making in established organiza-
tions (Fredrickson & Iaquinto, 1989) are fundamentally different from what occurs in
an entrepreneurial setting (Miller & Friesen, 1984). Without policies and procedures
in place, individuals must use their own decision-making rules or heuristics to guide
their decision making. These decision-making shortcuts may enable individuals to
deal with the large amounts of unresolved uncertainty and to make decisions that must
be made quickly and efficiently without full consideration of the risk involved. Thus,
biases and heuristics and their use by entrepreneurs are central to understanding the
entrepreneurial process. The use of biases and heuristics facilitates a perceived sense
of overall understanding and a sense that the “rules of the game” are understood. More
cautious decision makers will tend to function better in larger organizations in which
more extensive information tends to be more readily available and in which various
decision tools are more readily available. Additionally, decision makers in larger firms
have more resources to collect data more systematically, analyze it more carefully, and
thus make more risk-averse decisions.
A large number of biases and heuristics have been studied in the nonrational
decision-making literature (Bazerman, 1990; Hogarth, 1987). From among all these
biases and heuristics, we chose to examine differences between these sets of individu-
als with reference to two biases and heuristics: representativeness and overconfidence.
Representativeness is one of the most widely referenced heuristics (e.g., Kahneman &
Tversky, 1972; Katz, 1992). Overconfidence was chosen because of its similarity to a
number of other biases and heuristics identified in the literature (Kahneman et al.,
1982). Furthermore, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) used both of these biases and heu-
ristics to build their arguments for a cognitive perspective on risk taking.
Representativeness. In their description of representativeness, Tversky and Kahne-
man (1971) asserted that this heuristic was widely used in decision making. Decision
makers manifesting this heuristic are willing to develop broad, and sometimes very
detailed, generalizations about a person or phenomenon based on only a few attributes
of that person or phenomenon. In an extreme form, an individual closely associated
with a new project is likely to sketch a representative scenario that captures the essen-
tial elements of the history or the future (Kahneman & Lovallo, 1993). For example, if
Bill once used a single piece of equipment manufactured by “Firm A” and strongly dis-
liked it, the utilization of this heuristic would lead to a bias against all equipment made
by that manufacturer.
The particular form of representativeness heuristic examined here is a willingness
to generalize from small, nonrandom samples. The law of large numbers suggests that
large random samples can be used to make rigorous inferences about population statis-
tics. However, sometimes decision makers are willing to make such inferences, not
from large random samples but from small, nonrandom samples. The most common
type of small, nonrandom sample used as a basis for generalization is, of course, per-
sonal experience (Kahneman et al., 1982).
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Again, there is little doubt that the representativeness heuristic, and especially the
willingness to generalize from small, nonrandom samples, is a decision-making heu-
ristic that may be particularly well suited for entrepreneurial settings (Katz, 1992). In
such settings, there is rarely the time, or the institutional support, to obtain large ran-
dom samples, even if they do exist. To make these risky decisions, entrepreneurs read-
ily succumb to their own decision rules and to their sometimes narrow experience
base. Entrepreneurs’insensitivity to risk will be manifested in their greater susceptibil-
ity to risk. Individuals who are less susceptible to heuristics stemming from small sam-
ple sizes are likely to be attracted to larger firms, in which the time and other resources
needed to choose a more representative sample are likely to be available. These obser-
vations lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: As a reflection of their insensitivity to risk, entrepreneurs will be more willing
to generalize from small sample sizes than managers in large organizations.
Overconfidence. This bias identifies how decision makers tend to be overly opti-
mistic in their estimation abilities on receiving initial information (Alpert & Raiffa,
1982; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977; Oskamp, 1965), particularly when they
are relatively unfamiliar with the problem and/or when substantial uncertainty exists
(Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, & Phillips, 1982). Overconfidence emanates from the
anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Bazerman, 1990; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974)
and is one of the more commonly referenced decision-making biases (Hogarth, 1987;
Schwenk, 1988). Decision makers tend to be overconfident in their initial assessments
and slow to revise their initial judgments appropriately as additional information
becomes available (Schwenk, 1988).
The issue of overconfidence among entrepreneurs has been studied by Cooper et al.
(1988), who found that entrepreneurs assigned a substantially higher probability of
success to their own ventures while assigning lower probabilities of success to other
ventures like theirs. Overconfidence, as a decision-making bias, is likely to be a com-
mon phenomenon for decision makers in entrepreneurial settings. As suggested ear-
lier, given the enormous decision-making uncertainty facing these individuals, and the
speed with which decision making must occur (Eisenhardt, 1989), decisions will be
made before “all the information is in.” From a positive perspective, individuals are
more likely to be willing to make risky decisions if they feel confident in their ability to
implement them (Heath & Tversky, 1991). Consequently, individuals with a greater
sense of overconfidence are likely to function better in an entrepreneurial setting
because they will be less overwhelmed with the multiple hurdles they face. Individuals
with less of a tendency toward overconfidence will be more attracted to larger organi-
zations in which more risky decisions will generally be approached in a more
programmed and systematic manner. These observations lead to the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: As a reflection of their tendency to make more risky decisions, entrepreneurs
will manifest more overconfidence in their decision making than managers in large
organizations.
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METHOD
Measures
Representativeness. To measure the use of the representative heuristic, we followed
the approach used by Fong and Nisbett (1991) and Fong, Krantz, and Nisbett, (1986) in
which subjects were given scenarios representing various types of real-to-life strategic
decisions. As in the scenarios developed by Fong and colleagues, both of our problems
portrayed a strategic decision pitting two alternatives against one another. One alterna-
tive was based on quantitative/statistical information, whereas the other was based on
heuristic reasoning. Problem 1 involved the purchase of a major piece of equipment,
whereas Problem 2 depicted an automation update decision (see the appendix for these
two problems). Subjects were told to decide between the two alternatives for each
problem and then to describe their reasoning for reaching the designated decision.
Coders then analyzed these responses to determine whether heuristic-type reasoning
was used by the respondents to answer these scenarios.
The coding schema used to analyze the responses also closely paralleled that of
Fong et al. (1986) and Fong and Nisbett (1991). A code of 1 was given for responses
that contained no mention of statistical reasoning but relied instead on subjective opin-
ions or simple “rules of thumb.” Examples of this form of reasoning included reference
to personal experience or simple decision rules like “buy American” and “personal
experience.” A code of 0 was given for responses that contained some form of statisti-
cal reasoning, including references to variability or sample size. There were 17
responses that were uncategorizable due to a lack of information given by the respon-
dent and were, therefore, omitted from subsequent analyses.
After some initial training, all responses were coded blind to conditions according
to these criteria by two individuals (the author and a graduate student). There was exact
agreement between Coder 1 and Coder 2 84% of the time across the two problems. In
cases in which disagreement existed, the evaluation of a third coder (another graduate
student) was used to resolve the disparity. These results were then summed across the
two problems to create a single three-category variable (0-2). A sum of 0 indicates sta-
tistical reasoning in both scenarios, 1 indicates a mix response, and 2 indicates heuris-
tic reasoning was used throughout.
Overconfidence. To measure overconfidence, the procedure used in the widely
cited studies conducted by Fischhoff et al. (1977) and Lichtenstein and Fischhoff
(1977) was replicated. A series of five questions based on death rates from various dis-
eases and accidents in the United States was developed. All items were dichotomous in
nature with the general form of “Which cause of death is more frequent in the United
States? A. Cancer of all types, B. Heart disease.” One of the two choices is correct
based on the most recent vital statistics report prepared by the National Center for
Health Statistics. Subjects were asked to make two responses to each item. First, they
were to choose one of the two alternatives as their best guess of the correct alternative.
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Second, they indicated, on a provided scale ranging from 50% to 100%, the level of
confidence they had in their answer. In the instructions, they were told that 50% would
indicate that their answer was a total guess, whereas 70% would indicate that they
thought they had 7 chances in 10 of being correct. A response of 100% would indicate
that they were totally confident that their choice was right. Again, in taking our cues
from the earlier work of Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, all “level of confidence”
responses were grouped into one of six probability categories: .50 to .59, .60 to .69, .70
to .79, .80 to .89, .90 to .99, and 1.00 for analysis purposes. Those probability
responses that were in the .50 to .59 range were coded as .50, .60 to .69 responses were
coded as .60, and so forth.
For the purpose of statistical analyses on each observation, a confidence score was
computed. Again, following the lead of Fischhoff et al. (1977), this was done by noting
the mean probability response across all items for each subject and the percentage of
items for which the correct alternative was selected. The difference between these two
scores then becomes a measure of overconfidence or underconfidence (a positive score
indicates overconfidence, whereas a negative score indicates underconfidence; the
higher the score, the greater the overconfidence). For example, a respondent who
answered .50, .60, .70, .70, and .90 and gave the correct answer three out of five times
would receive an overconfidence score of .08 (mean of .68 minus .60).
Risk propensity, education, and age. Although previous research on differences in
risk propensity between entrepreneurs and managers in large organizations has gener-
ated mixed results, we wanted to control for this trait. Risk propensity was assessed by
using the Jackson Personality Inventory (Jackson, 1976), which consists of 16
dichotomous items. Jackson (1977) reported reliability coefficients of .81 to .84 for
risk propensity in terms of scale homogeneity and test-retest stability. Sexton and
Bowman (1984) reduced this risk propensity scale developed by Jackson to 8 items to
better accommodate survey research. The use of this 8-item risk propensity dichoto-
mous scale yielded a Kuder-Richardson-20 (KR-20) reliability coefficient of .77, with
scores ranging from 0 to 8. Because the use of biases and heuristics may vary with age
and education, we also inserted the birth year of the respondents as a control variable.
Sampling
Samples from two populations were drawn: a sample of entrepreneurs and a sample
of managers in large organizations. Survey research was used to collect the primary
data.
The sample of entrepreneurs. The sales tax file of a state comptroller’s office was
used to identify potential entrepreneurs because of its superior capability for identify-
ing new businesses (Busenitz & Murphy, 1996). These files contain the name and
address of the owner, organization, organization type, SIC code, and date of first sale.
A sample of firms showing a date of first sale within the past 2 years and having an SIC
code in the 2800, 2900, 3000, 3500, 3600, 3700, and 3800 categories was selected.
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These SIC categories include the manufacturing of plastics, electronics, and instru-
ments. A priori, it was thought that these categories would represent a higher percent-
age of newly emerging firms because they represent more dynamic industries. This
procedure resulted in a sample of 573 entrepreneurs. A mail questionnaire was devel-
oped and sent to the identified sample. A total of 176 responses from entrepreneurs
were received, for a 31% response rate.
Because, historically, identifying entrepreneurs has been somewhat problematic
(Gartner, 1988), we wanted to be more precise in our operationalization. Our opera-
tionalization consisted of two dimensions. First, respondents had to have been a
founder of the identified firm. Being responsible for an independent start-up is widely
used as a distinguishing feature of entrepreneurship (Begley & Boyd, 1987; Cooper
et al., 1988) and, thus, was used here as a prerequisite for inclusion in the sample for
this study. With the second dimension, subjects had to be currently involved in the
start-up process. This was operationalized by requiring our subjects to have started
their venture within the last 2 years and/or currently planning on starting another ven-
ture within the next 5 years. These restrictions resulted in 124 usable responses. The
average time since founding for the entrepreneurs included in this sample was 1.7
years. The 52 omissions occurred because either they were not the founder (e.g., they
had purchased or inherited the firm) or had founded the firm more than 2 years ago and
they were not currently contemplating another start-up. To test for a biased response,
nonrespondents were compared to respondents based on the two-digit SIC categories
identified above. The results from the chi-square test suggested that the usable
response was not biased, c 2(5) = 1.782, p = .878.
Managers in large organizations. In this study, managers in large organizations
were defined as individuals who have responsibility for at least two functional areas
(such as marketing, finance, personnel, research and development, and manufactur-
ing) and work for publicly owned organizations with more than 10,000 employees.
These managers are often referred to as divisional or general managers because
they oversee multiple functional areas (e.g., marketing, research and development,
accounting, manufacturing). This classification of managers was chosen because their
work most closely parallels the work of entrepreneurs (versus the top-level corporate
executives who regularly deal with mergers and acquisitions, public financial markets,
and other external stakeholders). To be included in this study, the managers had to
oversee at least two functional areas (the sample average was 4.55 functional areas).
Contact was made with three organizations, and two agreed to participate in the study.
Data collection was coordinated through the human resource departments of the
respective organizations with a company cover letter attached. Usable responses were
received from 95 of the 176 managers to whom surveys were sent, for a usable
response rate of 54%. The SIC for the managers included in this sample came from the
1300, 3400, 3500, 3600, and 3800 segments. The results of the chi-square test on the
SIC variable between usable responses and nonrespondents again suggest that the
response was not biased, c 2(4) = 3.973, p = .59.
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RESULTS
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlation coefficients among
all variables. In this study, managers in large organizations were coded as 1, whereas
the entrepreneurs were coded as 2. The correlations show that the overconfidence and
representativeness variables are significantly related to being an entrepreneur versus a
manager in a large organization. These zero-order correlations indicate preliminary
support for the hypotheses.
One-way ANOVA analysis was also used to examine possible differences in scores
between entrepreneurs and managers in large organizations. The mean score with the
representative heuristic was 1.24 for entrepreneurs versus 0.53 for managers (F =
50.16, p < .001). As for overconfidence, entrepreneurs scored a mean of 0.106,
whereas managers scored 0.045 (F = 5.53, p < .05). As for the control variables, only
education was significant with managers, on average, having a higher level of formal
education (4.24 vs. 2.98; F = 68.87, p < .001). Notably, we found now differences in
the risk propensity (the mean score for the entrepreneurs was 5.47 vs. 5.12 for the man-
agers in large organizations, F = 1.08, ns).
Further analysis was conducted using a multivariate approach. Because our
dependent variable is dichotomous (managers in large organization were scored as 1
and entrepreneurs as 2), logistic regression was employed as the primary test of the
hypotheses. The results presented in Table 2 show that entrepreneurs are more likely to
be affected by representativeness and overconfidence than are managers in large
organizations. Even after controlling for education, age, and risk propensity, the biases
and heuristic effects endure. Taken together, these results suggest that the way entre-
preneurs approach and deal with risky decisions is significantly different from that of
managers of large organizations. These data indicate that entrepreneurs do not view
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TABLE 1
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Variable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Entrepreneurs/managers
2. Education entrepreneurs 2.78 1.18
Education managers 4.03 1.00 –0.49**
3. Age entrepreneurs 44.12 11.62
Age managers 45.12 6.21 –0.05 0.01
4. Risk-propensity entrepreneurs 5.20 2.42
Risk-propensity managers 5.14 2.33 0.02 0.056 –0.01
5. Representativeness entrepreneurs 1.10 0.78
Representativeness managers 0.42 0.54 0.44** 0.33** –0.7 –0.04
6. Overconfidence entrepreneurs 0.07 0.19
Overconfidence managers 0.009 0.185 0.16* –0.11 0.02 –0.04 –0.04
*p < .05. **p < .01.
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themselves as preferring more risky adventures as shown in the risk propensity scores,
but they do use biases and heuristics more readily to evaluate their decisions. The use
of biases and heuristics is an important breakthrough in understanding entrepreneurial
decision making.
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
The importance of transformational change (Nutt & Backoff, 1997) and the risk
entrepreneurs encounter has long been a central part of the entrepreneurship literature
(d’Amboise & Muldowney, 1988; Low & MacMillan, 1988). However, it has been
somewhat disconcerting that most academic efforts to test entrepreneurs for a higher
risk propensity have met with limited success even though they consistently engage in
more risky events. This article presents empirical evidence indicating that entrepre-
neurs use biases and heuristics in their decision making more extensively than manag-
ers in large organizations do. Together with the Palich and Bagby (1995) findings that
entrepreneurs tend to look at business opportunities more positively, we now have an
important new window from which to probe how entrepreneurs think about and deal
with risk.
First, these findings help explain why entrepreneurs have consistently not been
found to have a higher risk propensity. Entrepreneurs do not view themselves as being
more desirous of risky adventures. Furthermore, these findings indicate that entrepre-
neurs do not approach the starting of a new venture from a sequential and methodo-
logical perspective. If they approached the start-up process in a more comprehensive
manner, the venture would probably never be started due to the lack of information, or,
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TABLE 2
Results of Multivariate Analysis: Logistic Regression
Independent Variables Parameter Estimate Wald Chi-Square
Intercept 2.12 3.1
Education –0.91*** 30.02
Age –0.01 0.38
Risk propensity 0.118 2.016
Representativeness 1.46*** 22.97
Overconfidence 2.19* 4.54
Pseudo R2 0.33
Model chi-square 89.7***
df 190
Hit ratio (%) 78
NOTE: As noted in the Method section, 52 observations were omitted from our entrepreneurship sample to
control for a possible success bias because either the respondent was not the founder (e.g., he or she had pur-
chased or inherited the firm) or had founded the firm more than 2 years ago and was not contemplating an-
other start-up in the near future. However, the above model was rerun to include these 52 observations. The
significance levels of all variables remained unchanged from those reported above.
*p < .05. ***p < .001.
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where sufficient information was available, the probabilities of success would be so
low that the venture would rarely be pursued. However, with entrepreneurs, their
biases and heuristics indicate that there is a major opportunity to be capitalized on
and/or that problems with fulfilling their expectations for the venture do not exist or
will be addressed later.
A second implication of this study addresses the contextual versus person-specific
nature of the risk. Some studies have concluded that risk is highly contextual (March &
Shapira, 1987; Ray, 1994). However, given that this study found consistent differences
across our samples of entrepreneurs and managers in how they responded to two dif-
ferent decision scenarios and death-rate questions, it suggests that how one responds to
risky situations is more than just contextual. Those who are more susceptible to the use
of biases and heuristics may actually gravitate toward and function better in more
uncertain and risky situations. Of course, additional research is needed to further
examine this conclusion.
Some authors have argued for ways to improve one’s decision making by protecting
against the influence of biases and heuristics (Bazerman, 1990; Russo & Schoemaker,
1989). However, in the entrepreneurship context, the use of biases and heuristics may
be potentially advantageous. Without using biases and heuristics extensively, most
new ventures would never get launched within an appropriate window of opportunity.
Thus, a third potential implication of this study is that biases and heuristics may be
important mechanisms that entrepreneurs use to sift through a large diversity of infor-
mation in the face of much uncertainty. As Stevenson and Gumpert (1985) stated,
“successful risk takers have the confidence to assume that the missing elements of the
pattern will take shape as they expect” (p. 88).
The puzzle of starting a new venture is usually very scrambled, and those individu-
als who use heuristics more extensively to assist in their strategic decision making are
the only ones who are most likely to attempt such a start-up. Although there are no
doubt shortcomings to an entrepreneur’s clouded or naive perceptions of risk, such an
approach may help explain why entrepreneurs are frequently able to transform an idea
into a growing enterprise. In other words, it may be the naiveness of the risk involved
that enables entrepreneurs to forge ahead with their new ideas. If entrepreneurs would
carefully calculate all the risks involved in starting a new venture, most new ventures
would never be started. Stated differently, some individuals may have a competitive
advantage in dealing with the risk inherent in new business start-ups. Of course, future
research needs to examine more carefully these implications. Also, building on the
work of Raynor (1974), Miner (1990), and others, it might be interesting to investigate
if and when insensitivity to risk via the use of biases and heuristics moves from being
an advantage in the start-up process to becoming a disadvantage as the organization
grows and matures.
The use of biases and heuristics may also offer some help in explaining why entre-
preneurs sometimes make bad managers (Schell, 1991). Although the use of biases
and heuristics can be very beneficial, it may lead to major errors in evaluating the riski-
ness of key strategic decisions. Although research has yet to establish performance
implications, it is possible that the more extensive use of heuristics in strategic
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decision making may be a great advantage during the start-up years. However, it also
may tend to lead to the demise of a business, particularly as a firm matures.
Finally, understanding the perspective of entrepreneurs, as reflected in their use of
biases and heuristics, provides an important window into understanding how they
function and why they undertake risky endeavors. If researchers do not understand
how entrepreneurs view risk, then it is going to be very difficult to help entrepreneurs
develop strategies for coping with various risks and help them manage risk.
APPENDIX
Problem 1: Equipment Purchase Decision
Mr. Johnson is about to invest in a new machine and has narrowed his options to Machine A,
which is made in the United States, or Machine B, which is made overseas. Both machines are
equally capable of performing the same function. In considering this decision, Mr. Johnson said
to his friend, “You know, it seems that every time I buy a piece of equipment made by a foreign
manufacturer, it breaks down in the first month of use.”
After further discussion, Mr. Johnson’s friend remembers a recent industrial report that gives
a significantly higher ranking to Machine B (the one made overseas) than to Machine A. This re-
port bases its recommendation on extensive testing as well as on feedback from dozens of users.
If you were in Mr. Johnson’s position, which machine would you purchase? Why?
Problem 2: Automation Update Decision
The president is urging the board of directors to accept the purchase of a state-of-the-art com-
puterized machine that would fundamentally change their operations. After describing the capa-
bility of this machine, the president cites a recent nationwide study that examined 120 busi-
nesses making similar upgrades. Results indicated that at least 85% showed a sizable increase in
productivity. In a parallel control group of firms not making the upgrade, about half as many
firms (40%) showed a sizable increase in productivity. Based on this study, the president con-
cludes that the computerized machine needs to be purchased.
One of the directors now takes the floor giving two reasons why computerized equipment is
not the real reason for increased productivity. First, the managers of businesses that make such
changes are likely to be more energetic and adventurous, thus creating an environment for supe-
rior performance. Second, any change is likely to lead to superior performance because of the in-
creased interest and commitment on the part of management.
If you were participating in such a decision, whose line of reasoning (president or director)
would you be more likely to accept? Why?
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